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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of equitable relief seems, quite clearly, both theoretically and
practically untenable. Very simply put, a money judgment for
damages which produces, and can produce, no money because
of the defendant's insolvency, is an "adequate" remedy only
in the most technical and unrealistic understanding of that term.
If equity truly looks to substance rather than form, and if its
function is to provide a remedy where justice demands that the
plaintiff be accorded a remedy, then equity must recognize the
insolvency of the defendant as a sufficient ground, in and of itself,
for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction. Such exercise, of course,
must be consistent with the totality of equitable jurisprudence so
that, if recognized, such jurisdiction would still be subject to
equity's traditional power of discretionary abstention when the
decree would result in undue hardship to third persons such as
creditors. It is submitted, further, that the UCC's narrow
recognition of insolvency as a basis for specific performance in-
creases, rather than decreases, the need for the general recognition
of such a remedy precisely because of the limited applicability
of the Code provision. The requirement that the seller become
insolvent within ten days from his receipt of the buyer's first
payment of the purchase price in order that the buyer might avail
himself of his specific performance remedy has its basis in the
concern for the possible fraudulent effect of a longer period of
retention on seller's other creditors. But, again, it is submitted
that if there are no other creditors or if their claims are such
that they will not be prejudiced by the relief granted, insolvency
of the defendant should be an independent ground for plaintiff's
obtaining specific performance and should be so apart from any
arbitrary time limit for the onset of defendant's insolvency. The
state of the law in this area is such that the courts should at least
re-examine the validity of their present positions, instead of merely
setting forth the negative position in summary fashion and assuming
its validity. It _seems probable that, were this re-examination
undertaken, the courts would reject the traditional technical basis
for excluding insolvency as a basis for equitable jurisdiction and
allow relief on that basis in all cases where such relief could be
granted in a manner consistent with other applicable equitable
considerations.
POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF ACCOUNTANTS TO THImD
PARTIES FOR NEGLIGENCE
A public accountant has a duty to his client to perform the
accounting services bargained for with the skill to be expected
of a reasonable, prudent man with his knowledge and training.
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A breach of this duty renders the accountant liable to his
client for tort and contract damages.' However, the prevailing rule
has been that the accountant is not liable for negligent misstatement
of the financial condition of his client to third parties who relied
thereon.2  But, recently, there has been an influx of suits seeking
to overturn this rule of no liability for negligence outside privity
of contract? The purpose of this note is to examine the various
theories upon which accountants have been held liable to third
parties for misstatement, in order to determine whether it would
be feasible to expand the grounds for liability.
Liability for Negligence
It has long been clear that privity of contract is not a re-
quirement for a cause of action if the action is based upon the
defendant's intentional deception of a plaintiff. It follows, therefore,
that if an accountant intentionally certifies a false balance sheet,
knowing that it will be used to induce other parties to lend money
or extend credit, he is liable for his fraud to parties whom he
should reasonably have expected to rely upon his misrepresentations. 4
However, the law governing liability to third parties in the
general area of negligence has followed a different course. The
early rule was that there would be no liability for negligence except
to parties in privity." This strict limitation was gradually weakened
by cases such as Heaven v. Pender.6  In that case, defendant,
a dock owner, put up a staging outside a ship in his dock under
a contract with the shipowner. Plaintiff was a worker employed
I Note, The Accountant's Liability-For What and to Whom, 36 IowA
L. R v. 319, 320-21 (1951).
2 At this point, it is important to mention that the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended in 1934, provided for liability of the accountant to investors who
lose money in the acquisition of securities which were described by a regis-
tration statement containing false data prepared by such accountant. An
accountant would not be liable under the statute if his statement had been
neither negligent nor fraudulent; the burden of proving this lack of fault is
on the defendant-accountant. The provision presently appears in 15 U.S.C.
§ 77www (1964). However, the application of the statute does not extend
to protect those who merely grant credit to the party described in the finan-
cial statement. See Meek, Liability of the Accountant to Parties Other Than
His Employer for Negligent Misrepresentation, 1942 Wis. L. REV. 371, 383-88.
A more complete discussion of the federal statute is beyond the scope of this
note. However, it should be mentioned that, at the time of the writing of
this note, there is a definite movement to extend federal statutory coverage.
See The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1966, p. 1, col. 6.
3 See The Wall Street Journal, supra note 2; Heinemann, Accountant
Role Undergoing Test, N.Y. Times, March 27, 1966, § 3, p. 1, col. 3; Edi-
torial, The Specter of Auditors" Liability, J. AccoUNTANcY, Sept. 1965, p. 33.
4 See Note, supra note 1, at 321.
G See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, (Exch. 1842), 10 M.&W. 109.
c 11 Q.B.D. 503 (C.A. 1883).
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by a ship painter who had contracted with the shipowner to
paint the outside of the ship. Plaintiff climbed on the staging
to paint the ship, and was injured when it collapsed. The de-
fendant was held liable despite lack of privity, the court resting
its holding on an analogy to a situation where a plaintiff is
invited onto the defendant's premises for their mutual economic
benefit. The privity doctrine was first abrogated in the United
States in cases where the negligence was such as would be likely
to put human life in imminent danger. Thus, in Thonis v. Win-
chester 7 the Court held a defendant-vendor liable for negligence
in mislabeling poison sold to plaintiff's wife. The privity rule
was further weakened by Judge Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.,8 wherein it was held that if the item causing injury
was something which, while not inherently dangerous, "is reason-
ably certain to place life and limb in danger when negligently
made," the manufacturer would be liable to the ultimate buyer
of his product.
In England, the courts were not willing to disregard the privity
requirement where the defendant's negligent misstatement would
cause mere economic injury to third parties. In LeLievre v. Gould,9
the plaintiff, a mortgagee, agreed with the mortgagor to advance
money to the builder of a house. The payments were to be made
as the building progressed, which progress was to be determined
and reported by the defendant, an architect and surveyor hired
and paid by the mortgagor. It appeared that the defendant was
aware of the arrangement, and knew that the plaintiff would rely
on his reports in advancing money. The defendant negligently
reported progress so that, when the plaintiff advanced money
to the builder in reliance upon the report, the expected security
was deficient. The project was unsuccessful and the plaintiff sued
the architect for damages. The court held for the defendant,
stating that he owed no duty of care to the plaintiff since there
was no privity. The court implied that the defendant would have
been liable to the plaintiff only for fraud. Heaven was distinguished
on the ground that there is an inherent difference between negligence
that can possibly result in bodily harm and negligence that can result
only in possible economic injury from reliance upon a negligent
statement.
Prior to 1922, this distinction was apparently recognized by
the American courts.10  However, in Glanzer v. Shepard,i" judge
Cardozo, writing for the Court, seemed to indicate that New York,
76 N.Y. 396 (1852).
8217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
9 1 Q.B. 491 (C.A. 1893).
10 See Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 AtI. 783 (1919) ; Seavey, Mr.
Justice Cardoso and the Law of Torts, 39 COLUm. L. REV. 20, 43 (1939).
11233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1920).
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in certain circumstances, would hold a party liable for his negligent
misrepresentations, even in the absence of privity of contract. In
that case, the defendant, a public weigher, supplied the plaintiffs,
purchasers of beans, with a certificate stating the determined
weight of a shipment of beans. The defendant supplied the
certificate at the request of the seller of the beans, with whom
he had contracted. After paying the seller in reliance upon
the weight certified by the defendant, the plaintiffs discovered that
the beans had been weighed incorrectly. The Court granted
judgment for the plaintiffs, concluding that when the defendant
undertook the task of weighing, he assumed a duty to weigh
carefully toward all those whose conduct would foreseeably be
governed thereby.
Those who construed Glanzer as implying that the New York
courts would, when the case arose, hold a public accounting firm
liable to third parties for its negligent audit, were proved wrong
by the decision of the Court of Appeals in Ultrantares Corp. v.
Touche.1 2 In that case, the defendants, a firm of public accountants,
were hired by a company to certify its balance sheet. The company
made a practice of borrowing extensively and exhibiting its balance
sheet to creditors as a basis for the loans. The defendants knew
of this practice. After they prepared and certified the balance sheet,
the defendants supplied the company with thirty-two copies, as
requested, although they did not know to whom these copies would
be distributed. The defendants annexed to the balance sheet their
certificate of audit which stated that the balance sheet was in ac-
cordance with the accounts and that it represented, in their opinion,
the "true and correct view" of the financial condition of the com-
pany. Relying upon the certificate, the plaintiff extended credit
to the company. Actually, the company had falsified its books
and was insolvent. The investigation by the defendants as to
the accuracy of the books was highly inadequate. The plaintiff
sued for damages it had incurred through its reliance upon the
certified balance sheet, proceeding on alternate theories of negligence
and fraud.
The Court held that the defendants were not liable to the
plaintiff for their negligence since there was no privity of contract.
It stated, however, that the defendants would be liable, even
without privity, if the plaintiffs could prove fraud.judge Cardozo, writing for the majority in Ultramares, felt
compelled to distinguish that case from the decision in Glanzer v.
Shepard. In Glanzer, the "end and aim" of the transaction was
to benefit the plaintiff, while in Ultrainares the service was primarily
for the information of the company, and only incidentally for the
use of third parties. Therefore, principles similar to those regarding
12255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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third-party beneficiary contracts were not applicable.23  The validity
of this distinction between the two cases has been challenged by
numerous authorities.'14  It would seem that, under contract theory,
a distinction such as the one posited by Judge Cardozo would
be valid. A court could find that the plaintiff in Glanzer was,
indeed, a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the
vendor and the defendant public weigher. Such a conclusion
would be untenable in an Ultramares situation. However, such a
distinction on grounds of contract theory cannot account for the
difference in the two holdings, since the Court in Glanzer based
its decision upon principles of tort, stating: "We do not need
to state the duty in terms of contract or of privity." '1
Under pure tort theory, it appears that the result in Ultranmares
should not have been opposite to that in Glanzer for the sole reason
that the party likely to be injured by the negligence was not
specifically known. The possibility of harm to the plaintiffs in
both cases seems to fall within the foreseeability or "risk reason-
ably to be perceived" rule of tort liability for negligence.
Apparently, the primary reason for the Court's refusal to
extend liability of accountants for negligence to third parties
was the public policy of not wishing to injure the accounting pro-
fession by imposing such a vast potential liability upon it.16 As
Judge Cardozo stated: "if liability for negligence exists, a thought-
less slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath
the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an in-
determinate class." "7 However, it has been suggested that a
better justification for Ultrainares is that practical reasons require
that liability for causing mere pecuniary loss should be more limited
than liability for causing physical harm.' Nevertheless, at the
time Ultramares was decided, there was ample precedent in New
York for disregarding the tort theory for the public policy reason
of avoiding the exposure of a class of people to practically un-
limited liability.' Whatever the distinction between Glanzer and
'13 Id. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
24 See, e.g., Note, supra note 1, at 326; Meek, supra note 2, at 382; Seavey,
supra note 10, at 48-49.
's Supra note 11, at 239, 135 N.E. at 276.
16 See Note, supra note 1, at 326; Seavey, supra note 10, at 48.
'7 Supra note 12, at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
Is Seavey, supra note 10, at 49.
19 See Ryan v. New York Cent. R, 35 N.Y. 210 (1866). There
a defendant who negligently caused a fire was held liable only for damages
resulting from the direct sparks of its fire, and not for damages that
occurred when the fire began to spread. The reason given by the Ryan
Court for the refusal to extend greater liability was lack of proximate cause,
but this logic seems fallacious. Apparently, the actual basis for the decision
was the public policy matter, i.e., the Court feared that it would be extremely
risky for one to live in a community if he might be liable in damages for
[ VOL. 41
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Ultramares, most courts accepted the doctrine that an accountant
is not liable to third parties for his negligent misstatement
20
It seems that the principal reason Ultrarnares has been generally
followed is that the courts have considered it socially undesirable
to extend potential liability to such an incalculable degree.21
However, in State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst,22 the New York
Court of Appeals rendered a decision which many thought relaxed
the standard of liability announced in Ultranmares. In that case,
the defendants, public accountants, knew that a balance sheet pre-
pared by them was unreliable in certain areas into which there
had not been an adequate investigation. The defendants furnished
their client with ten copies of the balance sheet which had been
certified by them and which contained no such notation of any
limitation or explanation. Subsequently, the defendants sent a new
balance sheet, identical to the first, but containing a reference to
a cover letter explaining the extent of their investigation. The
plaintiff extended credit in reliance upon the balance sheet originally
furnished and thereafter suffered a loss when the company became
insolvent. The Court upheld the jury's verdict for the plaintiff,
concluding that the negligence of the defendants in certifying and
issuing a balance sheet without qualification, which they knew
should not be relied upon without explanation, was sufficient to
allow an inference of fraud by the jury. Judge Lehman, dissenting,
stated that Ultramares established the rule that even gross negli-
gence is not sufficient for liability unless the accountants' investi-
gation was "so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was
no genuine belief back of it." 23 He concluded that the evidence
was not sufficient to justify an inference of fraud.
While it is possible that the jury erred on the question of
fact as to whether fraud could be inferred from the defendants' acts,
the language of the Court in its affirmance of the jury's verdict
did not manifest any intent to overturn the Ultrantares doctrine.
The holding in State Street has, however, been misinterpreted on
occasion to mean that gross negligence in itself is a sufficient reason
to impose liability.24
the destruction of an entire city simply because he negligently caused a fire.
Accord, Moch Co. v. Renssellaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896
(1928).
20 See Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants,
12 VAND. L. REv. 797, 815-16 (1959) ; Note, supra note 1, at 322. See, e.g.,
O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758 (1937);
Beardsley v. Ernst, 47 Ohio App. 241, 191 N.E, 808 (1934).
21 See Meek, supra note 2, at 389.
22 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
23 Id. at 126, 15 N.E.2d at 425.
24 See Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 73 Misc. 534, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
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Several jurisdictions have adopted the theory that there is a
conclusive presumption that when a man represents a fact to be
true to his own knowledge, he warrants the truth and becomes the
insurer of its accuracy. This position has tended to confuse the
areas of fraud and mere negligence.25  Since a certificate of audit
usually states that the balance sheet, to the knowledge or opinion
of the accountants, is a true representation of the financial condition
of the company, such a theory naturally operates to impair the
acknowledged Ultrarmares doctrine that an accountant would not
be liable for negligence, unless there was privity. It has been
suggested by some authorities that the Court in Ultramares itself
had adopted this strange theory.26  Upon analysis, however, this
conclusion seems fallacious. True, the Court in Ultran.ares did
state:
The defendants certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge, that
the balance sheet was in accordance with the books of account. If
their statement was false, they are not to be exonerated because they
believed it to be true.2 7
This language should not be interpreted to mean that when the
defendants certified the balance sheet as true to their own knowledge
they warranted its truth. It simply means that if the defendants
said it was true to their own knowledge, and they had no knowledge
on the subject, i.e., whether the balance sheet accurately reflected
the actual condition of the business, there would be no sincere
belief, and, therefore, the statement would amount to fraud.
Another and perhaps more confusing theory adopted by some
of the cases holds that a misrepresentation constitutes fraud if the
defendant would have known its falsity had he acted in a reasonable
manner. "In those jurisdictions which adhere to this extension,
negligence actually constitutes the basis of liability though under
the name of fraud." 2
8
In any event, the intermingling of negligence and fraud has
led to much uncertainty as to the state of the law regarding the
standard of liability of accountants.2 9  Actually, there is a clear
difference between fraud and negligence. A person is not guilty
of fraud if he actually believed what he said to be true. The
fact that he formulated this belief through grossly negligent activity
does not ipso facto negate all possibility that he did have an
25 Meek, supra note 2, at 376. This theory has been applied only when
the facts represented were capable of actual knowledge rather than just
opinion.
26 Meek, supra note 2, at 337.
27 Supra note 12, at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
28 Meek, supra note 2, at 375.
29 See Seavey, supra note 10, at 51-52.
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honest belief in its truth. On the other hand, the fact that the
defendant professed an honest belief after hasty and negligent in-
vestigation may lead a jury to conclude that he did not, in fact,
have such honest belief-these circumstances may properly give rise
to the "inference of fraud." If the jury, therefore, reasonably
decides that the defendant, though grossly negligent, was merely
stating what he actually believed was the truth, the Ultrantares
doctrine compels a decision for the defendant. However, even
if such an instruction were submitted to the jury, the question of
whether the defendant actually did have an "honest belief" is ex-
tremely hard to answer with any degree of certainty. This pre-
dicament, added to the possible utilization of one of the theories
described above-liability for gross negligence per se; statement
as "true to one's own knowledge" acting as a warranty; the
reasonable man standard in finding fraud-makes the question of
liability in a given case very unpredictable.30
In England, the courts have followed the rationale of Ultranzares
insofar as accountants' liability to third parties for their negligent
audits is concerned. In Candler v. Crane Christmas & Co.,31
the plaintiff invested money in a company on the basis of a balance
sheet prepared and certified by the defendant accounting firm.
The financial statement had been prepared with the knowledge
that it was to be utilized to induce the plaintiff to invest. The
defendant had been negligent in his audit, and the plaintiff lost his
investment when the company was liquidated. There was no
evidence of fraud. The court held for the accounting firm, reason-
ing that in the absence of a contractual or fiduciary relationship,
the defendants owed no duty of care to the plaintiff in preparing
and certifying the statement. Lord Justice Denning, in dissent,
would have held the defendants liable, but expressly confined this
opinion to cases "where the accountant prepares his accounts and
makes his reports for the guidance of the very person in the very
transaction in question." 32
The Candler case differed on the facts from Ultramares, since,
in the former case, the defendants knew that the plaintiff was
the specific party for whom the balance sheet was being prepared.
Based upon this disparity, it seems that even Lord Justice Denning's
dissent is consistent with Ultrainares, since he reasoned upon
principles analogous to Glanzer. Therefore, it would seem that
the majority was willing to limit the liability of accountants for
negligence to an even greater extent than the Court in Ultramares.
In Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners..33 the House
of Lords was faced with a controversy involving the liability of
30 See Hawkins, supra note 20, at 817-18.
31 (1951) 1 All E.R. 426 (C.A.).321d. at 435.
33 (1963) 2 All E.R. 575 (H.L.).
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bankers in giving references concerning the credit-worthiness of
their customers. Plaintiffs were a firm of advertising agents.
They had taken substantial advertising orders from a company on
credit terms, and, therefore, wanted to ascertain the company's re-
liability. Plaintiffs caused inquiries to be made by their own
bank of the defendants, who were bankers of the company in
question, and satisfactory references were given. Although the
case was decided in favor of the defendants, primarily because de-
fendants had expressly disclaimed liability when they gave their
opinion, the court commented unfavorably on Candler.
The decision in Hedley, in regard to its effect upon the
liability of accountants in England, has been interpreted to mean
that actions for professional negligence may be successful if financial
loss is suffered by third parties through their reliance upon the
professional skill and judgment of persons with whom there was
no contractual or fiduciary relationship.3 4  Hedley changed the
Candler doctrine to the extent that accountants can be held liable
when third parties rely upon their negligently prepared financial
statements if "the accountants knew or ought to have known that
the reports, accounts or financial statements in question were being
prepared for the specific purpose or transaction which gave rise
to the loss and that they would be shown to and relied on by
third parties in that particular connection." 3 Apparently, the
House of Lords in Hedley adopted the views stated by Lord
Justice Denning in his dissent in Candler. However, it is not
certain whether courts will view Hedley as imposing liability
upon accountants in a situation such as the one presented in
Ultramares, where the defendants knew their balance sheet probably
would be relied on by third parties but did not know exactly by
whom or in what specific transaction. In any event, it is clear
that the Hedley decision indicated a change from the prior English
rule, indicating a willingness to impose upon accountants a
greater liability to third parties.
The Recent Dilemma
Recently, there has been a new wave of litigation against ac-
counting firms in the United States. In March, 1966, it was
estimated that eighty law suits, involving more than twenty-
million dollars, were pending against public accountants through-
out the country. 36  All these suits were filed by investors and
3 Accountants' Liability To Third Parties-The Hedley Byrne Decision,
J. ACCOUNTANCY, Oct. 1965, pp. 66, 67. This statement was prepared for the
1 ublic by the Council of The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England
and Wales.
351d. at 67.
36 Heinemann, supra note 3. As of November 1966, 100 suits were re-
ported. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1966, p. 1, col. 6.
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creditors who alleged pecuniary loss due to the defendant account-
ing firms' failure to discover or report vital data concerning the
companies whose books they were auditing.37
Several possible explanations for this influx of suits have
been advanced: (1) the hope of banks and other financial in-
stitutions to make accounting firms a source of salvage when
credit losses occur; 38 (2) the general growth of the American
economy and the related increase in loss potential in the event of
a business failure; 39 and (3) the publicity accompanying the six-
million dollar lawsuit against Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., the
nation's largest public accounting firm, brought by the two largest
banks in the United States, the Bank of America and the Chase
Manhattan Bank.40
Regardless of the reasons for the suits, and although most ac-
countants expect them to fail, they have generated much concern
in the accounting community. While there is no reason under
classic negligence theory to allow accountants to escape liability
to third persons or classes of persons whom they could reasonably
have expected to rely upon their financial reports, the public policy
issue once again arises. It is feared that the future of accounting
firms, particularly small ones, might be jeoparized by exposure
to such potentially astronomical liability. It has been correctly
stated that "accounting firms are at a peculiar disadvantage in that
the numbers of people who might rely on an auditor's opinion, and
the amounts involved, are virtually unlimited. This is not generally
true of other professions." "' It also seems safe to say that the
possible liability of an accounting firm for its negligence, if a
duty of care to third parties were imposed by law, would be much
greater than the potential liability of a tortfeasor causing physical
harm. Obviously, it is not socially desirable to have reputable
accounting firms ruined financially because of one negligent audit.
However, much of this danger to accounting firms could be
alleviated through an adequate program of liability insurance for
negligence. Such coverage, now standard practice among account-
ings firms, includes any award of damages, as well as a portion
of the cost of defending in an action.42  If liability for negligence
were extended to third parties, premiums could be expected to
increase. It has been maintained that the extent of this increase
would render the cost of such insurance coverage prohibitive.43
37 Heinemnann, supra note 3.
33 Editorial, supra note 3.
39 Heinemann, supra note 3, at p. 9, col. 1.
40 Id. at p. 9, col. 2.
41 Editorial, The Specter of Auditors' Liability, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Sept.
1965, p. 33.
42 The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1966, p. 1, col. 6.
43 Editorial, stpra note 41, at 34.
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Just one year ago, fifteen insurance companies wrote such liability
policies relatively freely. Now, influenced by the many suits,
only six handle them as an "accommodation" for big accounts or
"in a limited manner." Several companies have raised their rates
by a third in order to make the coverage profitable.44  It is con-
ceivable that if some of the pending suits succeed, rates will go even
higher.
However, even if insurance costs were to increase, coverage
should not become absolutely prohibitive. Since, practically speak-
ing, all public accounting firms would be required to pay the
increased premiums, the extra expense could be partially allocated
to the general business comnmunity in the form of an increase in
the standard auditing fee. Also, the increased expense would
seem deductible as a business expense for federal income tax
purposes.45  These cost-absorbing devices, it is submitted, are
sufficiently adequate to warrant a fresh judicial inquiry into the
accountant's "immunity."
The Accountant's Due Care
It is submitted that there are two areas in which auditors
can act negligently as to third parties. The first area involves
the audit of the financial statement itself. The auditor has a
duty to investigate to see if the balance sheet reflects the actual
financial condition of the company. The first step in this process
is to compare the balance sheet to the books, to make sure
that the two coincide. The next step is to examine the accounts
themselves, to see that the entries are accurate. Certain accounts
are verified only on a sampling or test basis, since it would be
too tedious and unnecessary to do otherwise. Under this procedure,
auditors are deemed negligent if they fail to make a sufficient
number of checks or fail to investigate suspicious circumstances.
Accountants would not be held liable under the new negligence
test if they acted properly, but were duped by the company into
certifying a false balance sheet. This answers the complaint of
many accountants that often, even when the accountants have used
reasonable care in their investigation, it is impossible to detect
a well organized plan to deceive by an unscrupulous management.
The second area of possible negligence concerns the duty of
the auditors to accurately report the findings of their investigation
4 The Wall Street Journal, supra note 42; see Metz, Accounting Profes-
sion, Vexed by Lawsuits, Weighs Respotaibility to Shareholders, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 20, 1966, § 3, p. 1, col. 1.
45 Insurance premiums are generally deductible if the insurance is con-
nected with the taxpayer's business. For example, malpractice insurance
premiums paid by a physician are deductible expenses. 4A MmERE s, FEDERAL
INCoME TAXATION § 25.104 (1966 ed.). Rev. Rul. 60-365, 1960-2 Cum. BULL.
49.
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on the certified balance sheet, i.e., not only must the investigation
be adequate, but any doubts raised by the investigation must be
reported with the financial statement. The misrepresentation
usually does not involve the balance sheet itself, but the opinion
attached to the balance sheet, i.e., the auditor's certificate. The
certificate usually states that, in the opinion of the auditors, the
statement accurately represents the financial condition of the
company."' Standard auditing procedure dictates that the ac-
countant, when he associates his name with a financial statement,
must: (1) express an unqualified opinion; (2) disclaim an opinion
or express a qualified opinion when he has reason to believe that
the statement is not entirely reliable either because he has not
made an adequate investigation or because there were circumstances
which aroused his suspicions; or (3) when unaudited financial
statements are presented on his stationery without comment, disclose
prominently on each page of the financial statement the fact that
they were not audited. 47
The use of qualified certificates is one of the existing and
accepted standards of the accounting profession. If the accountant
expressly disclaimed a particular part of the financial statement,
he, of course, would not be liable for an inadequate investigation
affecting that part, since the disclaimer should indicate to potential
creditors of the company that they rely upon that portion of
the financial statement at their own risk. The disclaimer, however,
could not relieve the accountant from negligently failing to recognize
and pursue suspicious circumstances when his audit program is
otherwise adequate. A possible undesirable result of use of
disclaimers as a hedge against liability could arise where account-
ants, intimidated by the new standard of liability, use disclaimers
even though confident of the accuracy of their audit. Such a
practice would hamper the effectiveness of auditors, and could
prove to be a needlessly adverse reflection of the credit standing
of their client. There is also the strong possibility that an account-
ing firm which refuses, for these reasons, to give an unqualified
certification of its client's financial statement will find itself without
the client.48
Still, disclaimers have a definite value if used in proper cir-
cumstances-in situations where the accountant is unable to
adequately investigate a part of the financial statement. It is appro-
priate to note that the Council of the Institute of Chartered Ac-
countants in England and Wales recommends the use of disclaimers
413 Note, The Accountant's Liability--For What and to Whom, 36 IowA
L. Rzv. 319, 327 (1951).
47 See RoADY & ANDERSON, PRoFEssIoNAL NEGLIGENCE 264 (1960) ; American
Institute of Accountants, Committee on Auditing Procedure, Generally Ac-
cepted Auditing Standards-Their Significance and Scope (1954).
42 See supra note 42.
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to protect an accountant from liability to third parties. The method
approved is either to specifically restrict the scope of the auditor's
report or to express appropriate reservations in a note attached
to the financial statements and referred to therein.49
There is a fear on the part of many accountants that, even
when they have acted with due care, suits against them which
attempt but fail to establish negligence will nevertheless undermine
the profession and the firm because of the bad publicity. This
eventuality could be partially avoided by a pretrial review of
the facts by a panel of impartial experts.5° It is submitted that
were such an arrangement to be prescribed by the state legislatures
or appellate courts (assuming that accountants will be held liable
to third parties for negligence), it would serve an important role
in several respects: (1) the fear of the accountant-defendants that
a misdirected jury will find negligence where none existed, would
be alleviated; (2) the adverse publicity suffered by protracted
public litigation would be reduced; and (3) the amounts expended
on legal fees during the defense of an extended litigation will be
reduced.
As it exists today, there is some confusion as to the scope
of the accountant's liability under the Ultramares doctrine, i.e.,
the differentiation between fraud, negligence, gross negligence, and
inference of fraud.51 A clarification of this area would be brought
about if the courts recognized that accountants may be validly held
liable to third parties for negligence. Such action would set a
simple legal theory to be followed, let accountants know exactly
the extent of their liability, and permit them to procure insurance
based on this definitive statement of their responsibility. The
necessity of struggling through the intricacies of the intermingling
of fraud with negligence would be obviated.
It has been seen that the primary reason accountants have
not been held liable to third parties is the fear of possible economic
ruin to accounting firms. However, the fact is often ignored that
the creditor who has loaned money on the basis of a negligent
audit and who has not been negligent himself may also be facing
financial ruin if recovery is denied. The question then arises as
to who should sustain the loss-the negligent accounting firm which
could have foreseen the harm or the innocent creditor.
Conclusion
When English accountants were faced with liability to third
parties for negligence by the Hedley decision, they, as are their
American counterparts, were concerned. However, when they
49 Supra note 34, at 67.5o Editorial, supra note 41, at 34.
51 Ibid.
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realized that liability would be imposed upon them only for negli-
gence and only to a foreseeable group, they accepted the change in
the law with good grace. In fact, the accounting institute in
England stated in response to the Hedley decision:
Accountants have always recognized that they have a responsibility
to third parties in these circumstances, even if it was hitherto considered
to be unenforceable in law, and it is recognized best practice that . . .
the extent to which the accountant accepts responsibility should be made
clear beyond possibility of misunderstanding.. .52
Of course, the fact that English accounting authorities have
accepted the overruling of the Candler decision, where the defendants
knew exactly whom the relying parties would be, does not neces-
sarily imply that they would also so willingly accept liability in
an Ultramares situation. In any event, there is no reason why
American accountants should not follow this lead and recognize
that they should accept greater legal responsibility to third parties
who reasonably rely on their certificates. American accountants
have recognized a moral responsibility to such parties, and, for
the reasons stated in this note, there should be a legal responsibility
as well.
52 Supra note 34, at 67.
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